

# NATIONAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

## TRANSFERRABLE LESSONS FROM SERIOUS OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS / INVESTIGATIONS

Form: F3.27A

Issue: 01


Date: 02/09/17

### Transferable Lessons from Serious Operational Incidents / Investigations



Issue No: NR/OPS/039 Date Issued: 10/10/18

#### Line blockage irregularity Tram Inn Signal Box



#### Summary of Incident:

On 03/10/18 at 09:33 a line blockage was granted from Tram Inn SB to Abergavenny SB to protect an IWA between Pontrilas SB and Abergavenny SB. After the line blockage was granted the IWA reported that a Rail Head Treatment Train 3S59 passed through their line blockage at 09:44, when the train passed the IWA was in a position of safety.

Tram Inn would normally protect work between Tram inn and Abergavenny when Pontrilas SB (intermediate SB) is closed. The Line blockage/GZAC was planned with this in mind however, Pontrilas SB was open at the time and therefore should have protected the line blockage given that the work was in that area of signalling control.

Upon agreeing the line blockage arrangements, the trainee signaller was not familiar with the location of work given by the IWA (Trilley Mill - located between Pontrilas and Abergavenny). However, the line blockage signals were clearly identified between Tram Inn SB (TI 17 signal) and Abergavenny SB (AY 51 signal) so at this point the signaller/trainee signaller should have identified that the line blockage extended through Pontrilas SB area of control. The IWA was not aware Pontrilas SB was open. Both trainee and mentor signallers were aware Pontrilas SB was open. Pontrilas SB however was not made aware of the line blockage request.

Regardless, upon receiving train out of section from Pontrilas SB at 09:31, the line blockage was granted from Tram Inn SB to Abergavenny at 09:33 with RHTT 3S59 in section between Pontrilas SB and Abergavenny SB which then entered the line blockage at 09:44.

#### Learning points:

- Trainee signallers should be closely monitored at all times to ensure the correct application of rules and regulations are followed.
- Operational form NR3180 should be cross examined by the mentor signaller before line blockages are granted. Had this occurred the mentor signaller would have realised that the location extended beyond Pontrilas SB and either told the IWA to take the line blockage from Pontrilas SB or taken additional precautions.
- Signallers should be checking what planned line blockages are booked on commencement of their shift for knowledge and also workload planning and the Irregular opening/closing times of Pontrilas SB led to the line blockage being planned incorrectly from Tram Inn.

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### Points to consider and further actions and precautions:

- Signallers should check that trainee signallers have a clear understanding of any booked line blockages. Signallers should also check with the trainee at regular points during the line blockage request call.
- Countersigning of NR3180 by mentor signaller to ensure all details are correct should be considered.

**Briefed out to:**

All Frontline Operations Teams