

## NATIONAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

### TRANSFERRABLE LESSONS FROM SERIOUS OPERATIONAL INCIDENTS / INVESTIGATIONS

Form: F3.27A

Issue: 01

Date: 03/12/2019

Issue:

1

NR/OPS/

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
Date:

27/07/2020

## Multiple Points Run-Through & Near Miss —Wembley



NORMAL POSITION (identified by the point identification plate closest to the CLOSED end)



REVERSE POSITION (identified by the point identification plate closest to the OPEN end)

RT3183  
June 2014 (Issue 1 of 1)

**AGENT'S POINT SETTING FORM**  
(Form referred to in handbook HB4)

Record of instructions dictated to the Agent in connection with Manual Operation of Power Operated Points

Point No	End No	Position	Point No	End No	Position

Route from .....  
to .....

I confirm that all the above point ends have been operated/secured as necessary, as dictated by the Signaller at ..... signal box.

I have subsequently walked the route and am satisfied the route is correctly set. Signaller advised at ..... (time) ..... (date).

SIGNED ..... (Agent)

### Summary of Incident:

Due to a track circuit failure locking routes in the Wembley Central area, points had to be set manually on the ground and trains authorised to pass signals at danger on the Up & Down Slow lines at Wembley Central. The track circuit failure occurred after the passage of a freight service which left track circuits showing occupied, locking the points. The signaller using route cards, requested the MOM to set individual points for the route of the next train.

During the setting of the route, the MOM could not find the 'B' end of a set of points and may have assumed those points to be single ended. This inadvertently meant that the 'B' end remained in reverse position while the remainder of the route was set correctly in Normal.

During the conversation confirming the route setting, individual point ends were not mentioned with all points referred to in unison as 2541's and 2542's rather than the correct method of individual points '2541A' and '2541B'. Post incident review, the MOM did however state that only 'one end' had been set.

As a result, the next service ran through trailing points WM2541B in the reverse position, continued onto an alternative route, without challenging the lay of the points and created a near miss with the MOM who had initially set the route and also ran through another set of points.

### Learning Points:

- Know the difference between a simple and complex points failure. A complex failure requires a route setting agent to attend.
- Had the correct form (RT3183) been used, it is likely that this mistake would have been avoided.
- All points must be referred to singularly—number and point end identification i.e. WM2541A
- Reach a clear understanding of the intended route of the train traversing the point-work.

